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For over a century, psychologists have investigated themental processes of expert perform-
ers – people who display exceptional knowledge and/or skills in specific fields of human
achievement. Since the 1960s, expertise researchers have made considerable progress
in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie such exceptional
performance. Whereas the first modern studies of expertise were conducted in relatively
formal knowledge domains such as chess, more recent investigations have explored
elite performance in dynamic perceptual-motor activities such as sport. Unfortunately,
although these studies have led to the identification of certain domain-free generalizations
about expert-novice differences, they shed little light on an important issue: namely,
experts’ metacognitive activities or their insights into, and regulation of, their own mental
processes. In an effort to rectify this oversight, the present paper argues thatmetacognitive
processes and inferences play an important if neglected role in expertise. In particular,
we suggest that metacognition (including such processes as “meta-attention,” “meta-
imagery” and “meta-memory,” as well as social aspects of this construct) provides a
window on the genesis of expert performance. Following a critique of the standard
empirical approach to expertise, we explore some research on “metacognition” and
“metacognitive inference” among experts in sport. After that, we provide a brief evaluation
of the relationship between psychological skills training and metacognition and comment
on the measurement of metacognitive processes. Finally, we summarize our conclusions
and outline some potentially new directions for research on metacognition in action.
Keywords: metacognition, expertise, cognition, motor cognition, social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, sport,
sport psychology
INTRODUCTION
Expertise is characterized by superior reproducible performances
and“refers to the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distin-
guish experts from novices and less experienced people”(Ericsson,
2006a, p. 3). Quintessentially, sport provides many such instances.
For example, when Lewis (Lewis and Marx, 1996) became the first
track and field athlete to win four consecutive Olympic titles, he
accomplished this feat with a long jump of 8 m 50 cm, winning
by a margin of 21 cm. Sport is a domain that provides bench-
marks to distinguish experts from novices, through performance
outcomes (e.g., podium placing), player statistics (e.g., batting
average in baseball) or competition level (e.g., Olympic vs. Colle-
giate). Given such criteria, it is not surprising that the question of
how one becomes an expert within the sport domain has been of
increasing scientific (Ericsson, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2014a) and
popular interest (Ross, 2006; Gladwell, 2008) in the two decades
since Ericsson’s seminal paper on deliberate practice. “Deliberate
practice presents performers with tasks that are initially outside
their current realm of reliable performance, yet can be mastered
within hours of practice by concentrating on critical aspects and
by gradually refining performance through repetitions after feed-
back” (Ericsson, 2006b, p. 692). Although subject of much debate
(e.g., Baker and Young, 2014; Detterman, 2014), the theory of
deliberate practice and the development of expertise both war-
rant further analyses. This paper adds to the expertise debate
by presenting a novel argument contending that metacognitive
processes are central to expertise in the sport context. Further-
more, we suggest that some of the aforementioned controversies
in the research literature, that stem from conflict between those
focused largely on exploring the role of automaticity in skilled
performance, and researchers focused on understanding the rep-
resentation of experts knowledge, may have led to the explanatory
role of metacognition being overlooked.
In this review we propose that our understanding of aspects
of both social and cognitive dimensions of sporting expertise
can be adequately explained from a metacognitive perspective.
The potential of metacognitive inferences and domain-general
skills including psychological skills training (PST) are posited
as integral to the genesis of expert performance. Subsequently,
the contribution of both mental imagery (e.g., mental practice)
and attentional strategies (e.g., routines) to our understanding
of expertise and metacognition will be discussed. Finally, new
directions for future research that emanate from our metacog-
nitive perspective on sporting expertise will be outlined. Firstly,
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however, in the rationale for our approach we will attempt to
answer the following questions: are there limits to the current
expertise approach? Why is sport an appropriate field of study?
And finally, what is metacognition?
ARE THERE LIMITS TO THE EXPERTISE APPROACH?
Historically, the rich tapestry of research on expert performance
has been interwoven with a common thread-the study of grand-
masters in chess (Williams and Ericsson, 2005). Investigations
into expertise in chess, a competitive sporting activity that was
rule bound, amenable to measurement through objective rat-
ings (e.g., ELO rankings), with a range of possible contextual
requirements (e.g., blindfold chess; Campitelli and Gobet, 2005)
led to a proliferation of literature on the topic (de Groot, 1965;
Chase and Simon, 1973; Holding, 1985, 1992). Chess is a chal-
lenge of perceptual-cognitive skill and thus provides a fitting
laboratory for testing constructs such as pattern recognition,
visual imagery, and memory (Bilalic et al., 2010). Sport in the
more traditional sense emphasizes motor skill execution under
stressful conditions typically in a dynamic environment (Baker
and Young, 2014). One legacy of the chess expertise literature
was that this perceptual-cognitive lens was subsequently applied
in the sport domain (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Two interlinked
events led researchers to become enthusiastic in their study of
visual cognition and sport (Williams and Ford, 2007). Firstly, the
emergence of the expert performance approach (Ericsson and
Smith, 1991) and later, the theory of deliberate practice (Eric-
sson et al., 1993), both provided an impetus for investigations
into perceptual-cognitive skills, such as anticipation and decision-
making in sport. The tenet that sport could be a dynamic natural
laboratory was well made (Moran, 1996; Williams and Erics-
son, 2005) and the development of innovative methodologies
occurred in parallel (e.g., eye-tracking as a measure of atten-
tion). A burgeoning literature developed and sport as a domain of
study gained popularity as a result (Moran, 2009; MacIntyre et al.,
2013).
However, there were limits to this approach, particularly in
the focus on visual-cognitive expertise, which arguably was to the
detriment of our understanding of the underlying psychological
processes. Take, for example, the quiet eye phenomenon which has
recently gained prominence in sport science research (Vine et al.,
2014). Increasingly, this is becoming a topic of interest within both
cognitive psychology (Klostermann et al., 2013) and neuroscience
(Vine et al., 2011). The quiet eye is defined as “a final fixation or
tracking gaze that is located on a specific location or object in
the visuomotor workspace within 3◦ of visual angle (or less) for a
minimum of 100 ms” (Vickers, 2007, p. 11) prior to the onset of
a critical movement. According to Vickers, quiet eye offset occurs
when the gaze deviates off a specific location for more than 100 ms
(Vickers, 2007, p. 11). Despite the success in establishing a quiet
eye phenomenon“there has been a lack of explicit tests of the pro-
cesses through which quiet eye training interventions exert their
positive effect” (Vine et al., 2014, p. S237). To date, little knowl-
edge of the psychological basis of the quiet eye phenomenon has
emerged (Moran, 2012a). Similarly, while a wealth of knowledge
has accumulated on the characteristics of individuals’ saccadic
pursuit during visual attention tasks (Williams and Ford, 2007),
little evidence exists to support the trainability of visual search
(Mann et al., 2007).
A further limitation to the expertise approach is that, for exam-
ple, the focus has been on a narrow set of conclusions from
the original publication on deliberate practice (Ericsson et al.,
1993). Therefore, it is not surprising that the debate over the
contribution of deliberate practice to expert performance con-
tinues in chess (Campitelli and Gobet, 2011; Detterman, 2014),
sporting expertise (Williams and Ford, 2007; Baker and Young,
2014) and professional expertise (Ericsson, 2009; Hoffman, 2014).
Disagreements over the number of hours accumulated, start-
ing age, and the link to general cognitive abilities continue to
dominate the field (e.g., Gobet and Campitelli, 2007; Baker and
Young, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2014a). For example, Hambrick
et al. (2014b, p. 113) concluded that evidence had accumulated
to suggest that, although relevant, deliberate practice, in itself,
“does not largely account for individual differences in perfor-
mance.” One caveat to be considered here is that these authors
were concerned with the predictive ability of the theory solely
within the context of chess. The acquisition of motor skills in
the traditional sporting context is arguably more complex (Voss
et al., 2010). For example, even defining deliberate practice among
athletes is more challenging than with chess grandmasters (Mac-
Intyre et al., 2013; Healy et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the conclusion
by Hambrick et al. (2014b, p. 114) that “the question now is
what else matters” suggests that we should consider a broader
range of constructs in order to more comprehensively understand
expertise.
Before we consider the construct of metacognition, the ratio-
nale for studying athletes and sport performers must be made
readily apparent. Numerous authors have highlighted the role
in which sport can provide a natural laboratory for the study of
constructs within psychology and expertise (Ericsson and Smith,
1991; Moran, 1996; MacIntyre et al., 2013). According to Erics-
son (2009, p. 18) “performance can be publically observed and
even objectively measured in open competition and public perfor-
mances.” Similarly, it has been noted that the high performance
sport environment is dynamic. For example, typically perform-
ers have to execute complex skills under conditions of extreme
stress where their limits are being constantly challenged (Baker
and Young, 2014). Among the topics that have only recently
received scrutiny are the role of attention and the allocation
of effort in deliberate practice (Baker and Young, 2014). One
explanation for this is that researchers concentrated on the vari-
ables that were most measurable, including the quantification of
hours in practice (Helsen et al., 1998). A challenge for researchers
has been reconciling the automaticity and procedural knowl-
edge, central to expert sport performance, with the notion that
declarative knowledge and metacognitive abilities may also play a
role in the acquisition of expertise (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013;
Toner, 2014). To explain, while procedural knowledge is inherently
linked to optimum sport performance, declarative knowledge may
have both a debilitative (Beilock and Carr, 2001) and facilitative
role (Carson and Collins, 2011; MacIntyre et al., 2013; Brick et al.,
2014). For example, it is probable that Carl Lewis knew his precise
stride count to enable him to hit the board and take off into the
sandpit at the 1984 Olympic Games. Thus, expertise in sports goes
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1155 | 2
MacIntyre et al. Metacognition and sporting expertise
beyond mere procedural knowledge and arguably metacognitive
processes are present at all stages of the target skill and may work
in parallel. We thus propose an integrative model of expertise in
sports, one that explores action and cognition in sport, a topic that
has arguably only recently returned to the forefront of psychology.
In Rosenbaum (2005) suggested that researchers in psychology
have historically turned relatively late to cognition and action.
While this point is debatable, given the recent emergence of
research on exceptional performance states (e.g., Choking; Beilock
and Carr, 2001), the paucity of research on action in prior
decades may be worthy of review. Understanding movement had
long been the preserve of the fields of motor control, biome-
chanics, and neurophysiology perhaps due to the complexity of
the cognition-action nexus and the lack of clear methodological
approaches within psychology (Rosenbaum, 2005).“Thinking and
action seem to lie at opposite ends of the behavioral spectrum”
(Moran, 2012b, p. 1). The disembodied approach of information
processing theorists in the 1970s led scientists to conduct research
on thinking independently from the study of sensorimotor pro-
cesses and mechanisms (Laakso, 2011). It was not until the advent
of the motor cognition paradigm (Jeannerod, 1994) that “action”
became subject to intensive scrutiny by researchers in psychology
(MacIntyre et al., 2013). Jeannerod proposed that action, rather
than movement per se, was vital to understand, as evidence for
the role of cognition in movement planning was accumulating.
The interest in understanding action from different perspectives
was increasing rapidly (see Guillot and Collet, 2010). According
to Moran (2009) importance of inter-disciplinary collaboration
between researchers in cognitive sport psychology, cognitive psy-
chology, and cognitive neuroscience has been brought to the
fore by this new paradigm. Similarly, social cognition has devel-
oped as a field of study which has added considerably to our
understanding of action (Gallese et al., 2004; Frith, 2012). And
recently, cognitive researchers have embraced the study of the
domain of sport in their quest to understand how the mind
works (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Consequently, we propose that
metacognition, a construct that is central to motor cognition,
social cognition and action, can augment our current explanations
and understanding of the preparation and execution of motor
skills within the sport context and elucidate our conceptions of
expertise.
WHAT IS METACOGNITION?
Metacognition, or “knowledge or cognition about cognitive phe-
nomena” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906) is curiously under-explored in
the domain of expertise among sports performers (Moran, 1996;
MacIntyre and Moran, 2010). Elite athletes are not just experts
in movement execution but conceivably they are also experts in
planning, metacognition, and reflection. Metacognition has been
defined as an individual’s insight into and control over their own
mental processes (Flavell, 1979). In the decades since Flavell’s
(1979) pioneering article, the term metacognition has been oper-
ationalized as the scientific study of the mind’s ability to monitor
and control itself or, in other words, the study of our ability to
know about our knowing (Van Overschelde, 2008, p. 47). It is a
different kind of cognition as explained by Nelson (1999, p. 625):
“If one aspect of cognition is monitoring or controlling another
aspect of cognition, then the former aspect is metacognitive in
relation to the latter aspect. Flavell and subsequent investiga-
tors have suggested a tripartite model of metacognition, with
knowledge, control and monitoring components (Flavell, 1979,
1987; Tarricone, 2011; Halpern, 2014). Recently, Tarricone (2011)
indicated that the main interaction between metacognition and
self-regulation is to control, monitor, and regulate strategies to
meet task demands and goals. Previously, the study of metacog-
nition has targeted intellectual skills and a substantial corpus of
research exists on metacognition in educational settings (Hacker
et al., 2009). However, Augustyn and Rosenbaum (2005, p. 911)
recently challenged the status quo in metacognition research and
stated that “if intellectual and perceptual-motor skills rely on sim-
ilar mechanisms, one would expect metacognition to apply to the
guidance of perceptual-motor skills, just as it does to the guidance
of intellectual skills.” The approach among cognitive neuroscien-
tists, focused on visual perceptual tasks to measure metacognition
(Palmer et al., 2013; Weil et al., 2013), is similarly narrow, per-
haps due to methodological issues. Metacognition and action,
on the other hand, offers new possibilities in illuminating our
understanding of expertise and action.
EXPERTISE AND METACOGNITION
Expertise is tightly coupled with metacognition in both training
(e.g., knowledge of when a skill has been acquired) and com-
petitive settings (e.g., self-regulation under stress). We propose
that metacognitive processes are inherently related to expertise in
sports and we have summarized recent findings in the sport liter-
ature that reflect the prominence of metacognitive explanations
(see Table 1). Early investigations were focused on judgments
of learning (Simon and Bjork, 2001) and more recently more
specificity in the research questions has led to the development
of specific models (MacIntyre and Moran, 2010). In the coming
sections, we postulate that people use different sources of infor-
mation, including metacognitive inferences. Firstly, we contend
that expertise in any given area facilitates metacognitive inference
and secondly, that expertise itself may consist of metacognitive
inference, among a range of other non-metacognitive processes
including working memory and motivation. Given that exper-
tise is explained by differences in knowledge, many processes
involving the use of that knowledge are more or less auto-
matic or procedularized, and consequently they do may not
place onerous demands on working memory (Beilock and Carr,
2001). This creates the opportunity for metacognitive reason-
ing to optimize the assessment of situations and to structure
one’s goal pursuit. Furthermore, experts have quite good ideas
about standards and deviations from such standards, whether
this refers to one’s own behavior or to the behavior of oth-
ers. Deviations from sophisticated mental models (e.g., the
ideal long jump) are thus more likely to become salient to
experts than to non-experts, also providing opportunities for
reflective thoughts and interventions. The use of both action
simulations (e.g., mental practice) and pre-performance rou-
tines by elite performers can be conceptualized as domain-general
strategies which rely upon metacognitive processes. Evidence to
support these contentions will be presented in the forthcoming
sections.
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Table 1 | Recent research in sport that has highlighted the role of metacognition.
Topic Authors Method Emerging literature on metacognition
Meta-imagery Moran (2002) Conceptual Posed the question of whether meta-imagery abilities would
distinguish elite from non-elite performers.
Attentional strategies Nietfield (2003) Survey Indicated that the runners relied mostly on monitoring and
information management strategy (i.e., strategy thoughts during
running) regulatory cognitions.
Meta-imagery Weinberg et al. (2003) Survey Athletes were surveyed, not just on their use of imagery, but on
their perceived effectiveness of imagery for distinct functions.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2007a) Qualitative Relative to non-athletes (Denis and Carfantan, 1985), the participants
demonstrated an intricate understanding of imagery processes
including the use of imagery of realistic behaviors as opposed to
ideal performance imagery.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2007b) Qualitative Evidence from elite performers suggested that they possessed
sophisticated meta-imagery control skills – being able, for instance,
to restructure negative imagery so that it facilitates future
performance.
Psychological skills training Foster andWeigand (2008) Conceptual Psychological skills in sport (e.g., imagery, goal setting) can be
applied more efficiently, particularly in developmental contexts, by
applying metacognitive models to understand the role of
self-monitoring and self-regulation in the application of the above
strategies.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2010) Conceptual A model of meta-imagery was proposed with a specific emphasis on
expertise effects.
Attention and choking behavior DeCaro et al. (2011) Experimental Skill failure was linked to the extent to which skill execution depends
on explicit attentional control. Increased metacognitive awareness
may cause performers to evaluate their performance diverting
attention away from skill execution.
Meta-imagery Pearson et al. (2011) Experimental Findings support the role of meta-cognitive knowledge of imagery
ability and relate it to our ability to judge individual episodes of
imagery.
Attention and ironic processes Toner et al. (2013) Experimental Over-compensatory behavior was more prevalent amongst
low-skilled than high-skilled golfers and they concluded that future
research explore metacognition.
Attentional strategies Brick et al. (2014) Conceptual The authors in developing a tentative framework for attentional focus
in endurance activity, highlighted the potential benefits of applying a
metacognitive approach in future studies.
THE ROLE OF METACOGNITIVE INFERENCES
The Coliseum, Los Angeles, XXIII Olympic Games, August 8th
1984. A strong wind was swirling around the stadium in the
afternoon as Carl Lewis’s was preparing for his long jump (50
stunning Olympic moments No. 44: Carl Lewis’s four golds in
1984, 2012). ABC network commentators were referring to Carl
Lewis’ adjustments: “He has to block that out and has to only think
about heading down the runway and getting off as long a jump as
possible.” The other reporter then stated: “He has got a bit of a
headwind. I think that’s what he was waiting for. . . to decide what
he is going to do with his step with regard to this wind.”Carl Lewis
ran down the runway and leapt into the history books with a jump
that at that stage was 50 cm greater than his rivals. Nevertheless,
the commentators stated that it“looked like a very restrained effort
to me, the last four or five strides. . . he really looked like he was
sort of in that same stride that he was running in the last 50 m of
the 200 this morning [200 m heats]” (Corry, 1984).
After fouling his next jump, Lewis decided not to take his four
other allotted jumps and many of the crowd responded by booing
despite themargin of victory ultimately being 30 cm(Corry,1984).
Many of the spectators plausibly wanted him to break Bob Bea-
mon’s longstanding world record. However, Lewis’ rationale was
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that he had other goals to achieve (e.g., to equal Jesse Owens four
track and field gold medals in 1936) and he still had his additional
rounds to run in the 200 and 100 m relay. Given that Carl Lewis
won four gold medals, just as Jessie Owens had, we can conclude
that his strategies were successful. Both, the execution of the final
jump, in addition to his decision to rest, indicate metacognitive
inferences in addition to his athletic expertise.
When individuals perform skills in the sporting context the
social situation provides many pieces of information. For exam-
ple, when Carl Lewis is about to perform a long jump, he may
remember his coach’s words about his holding back on his speed
both to hit the board accurately and to preserve energy. As he
looks down the runway and notices that it is somewhat slippery,
and is unsure whether his left foot will begin to ache again, just
as it did 30 years ago he is metacognitively engaged. There may
be even much more metacognitive activity occurring than the
aforementioned examples may suggest. The cognitive system is
challenged with the amount of information that is accessible at a
given time and the implications that these pieces of information
may have for the execution of skill need to be considered. For
optimum adjustments, people need to be attuned to thoughts and
feelings about the self and the requirements of the social situa-
tion. Yet, given that most social situations provide a tremendous
amount of information, people need to be able to focus, that is,
they need to be selective. So, when it comes to particular tasks
such as a long jump, people need to select “what is relevant” and
ignore “what is not relevant” for the task at hand. How does this
work?
A model of metacognition
Bless et al. (2009) proposed a model of metacognition that focuses
on different information types. Specifically, cognitively accessi-
ble declarative knowledge (i.e., knowledge about something) and
feelings (e.g., how people feel about an action) and memories
(e.g., whether they can remember a coach’s instruction) serve
as information about the situation and the target in question.
This has particular resonance when people are uncertain about
the judgmental target or when affective states are not in line with
implications of the situation, then metacognitive processes are
more likely to come into play (e.g., Martin et al., 1993; Bless et al.,
2009). Metacognitive inferences are governed by rules or theories
that decide whether the accessible information should be used and
how it should be used in the moment.
When an expert judges performance, this may access a rep-
resentation about the target behavior (e.g., a motor image). For
example, imagine Carl Lewis watching his 1984 long jumps at
the Olympic Games. A vast amount of information about long
jumps, such as Bob Beamon’s Leap of the Century at the Olympic
Games in Mexico City in 1968, and his own jump might be cog-
nitively accessible at the time. Which pieces of information are
relevant? People apply filtering rules, considering whether the
information is relevant and representative for the target behav-
ior (e.g., Martin, 1986; Bless et al., 2009). Information might
just as easily become accessible in a conversation and thus com-
prise declarative information. Declarative knowledge is defined
as “knowing that” (e.g., taping factual information) and contrasts
with procedural knowledge, or skill memory, which is explained
as “knowing how” (Sternberg and Sternberg, 2012). For exam-
ple, Carl Lewis might have a chat with Bob Beamon and Mike
Powell about his 1984 long jump performance. If information
becomes accessible as part of conversations, the person also needs
to ask him or herself whether the information is appropriate to be
used for a judgment or decision. Here conversational rules as out-
lined seem to guide decisions on relevance and informativeness of
communicated information (e.g., Schwarz, 1994; Igou and Bless,
2003, 2005, 2007; Bless et al., 2009). Furthermore, metacognitions
may relate to past or future affective states. These are thoughts
that include many different sources of information (e.g., Wil-
son and Gilbert, 2003; Igou, 2004, 2008) and assessments of the
past or forecasts of future affective states are likely to influence
one’s behavior (Kahneman and Snell, 1992). For example, a long
jumper may know that he has felt good being in competitions
and thus decides to take part in one that is coming up in 2 weeks
time.
Another important type of information and likely source of
metacognitive processes are people’s feelings at the time of judg-
ments or behavior. For example, a long jumper’s mood, emotion,
or the ease with which information comes to mind, may influ-
ence the execution of the long jump. Importantly, these feelings
have informational value (e.g., Schwarz, 2002) for the judgment
or behavior at hand. Usually, affective feelings are distinguished
from cognitive feelings (Bless et al., 2009). Moods and emotions
are considered affective feelings, and they can inform us about
the situation and the target (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). For example,
according to Schwarz and Clore (1983), when asked to judge a
target (e.g., life in general), people ask themselves “How do I feel
about it?” which leads to positive evaluations when people are in
a positive mood, and to negative evaluation when they are in a
negative mood (e.g., Forgas, 2001).
The feeling of knowing (e.g., Koriat, 1993), ease of retrieval
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), familiarity (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989),
and processing fluency (e.g., Reber et al., 1998) are examples of
cognitive feelings (e.g., Bless et al., 2009; Huntsinger and Clore,
2011). In a nutshell, these are all experiences that accompany cog-
nitive processes and interact with these processes by serving as
information about judgmental targets. For example, according to
the ease of retrieval heuristic (Schwarz et al., 1991), if it is easy to
think of having performed long jumps, then one would be likely
to evaluate one’s jumping capacity more favorably, than if it was
difficult to retrieve such examples.
Memories have direct effects on how cognitive representations
are formed. However, congruent with Strack and Bless (1994)
and Bless et al. (2009), we argue that people also use theories
about the functioning of memory as an indicator as to whether
accessible information is valid and relevant for a judgment at
hand. For example, Carl Lewis may not remember that the coach
warned him to run within himself for the long jump run-up. Pos-
sibly, Carl would reason that he would remember that because
it would have been very untypical for his coach to hold this
opinion.
Our conceptualization of metacognition is in line with a broad
definitionof the construct, namely thatmetacognition is cognition
about both thoughts and feelings. However, the narrower defini-
tion of metacognition as control process (e.g., Shea et al., 2014) is
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also just as valid. The latter refers to processes in which attention
and cognitive control are essential in structuring peoples’ thoughts
and actions. As Shea et al. (2014) describe in detail, these types of
thoughts are associated with cognitive effort and limited capac-
ity (cognitive system 2) rather than automatic, effortless processes
(cognitive system 1; Stanovich, 2011).
Generally, monitoring and excluding accessible items of infor-
mation requires cognitive resources. As a result, reduction in
cognitive capacity increases the likelihood that relatively irrele-
vant information is used for the judgment task at hand (Bless
et al., 2009). To be clear, we do not think that metacognitions
always need awareness and controlled thought processes; however,
we believe that metacognitive inferences are especially influential
when people need to engage in this type of reflective behavior
in order make a judgment or decision. This is especially the case
when situations are ambiguous and complex, when more or less
automatic processes fail, or when accessible information is con-
flicting, contradictory, or perceived as inappropriate for the task
at hand.
PST AND METACOGNITION: THE CASE FOR DOMAIN-GENERAL SKILLS
Interestingly, the ability of Carl Lewis to combine excellence in
both track (e.g., 100, 200 m sprints and relay) and field events
(e.g., long jump) supports the domain-specificity of expertise. To
explain, long jump performance is determined largely by the ath-
lete’s ability to attain a fast horizontal speed at the end of the
approach runway, thus the physiological task demands were com-
patible (Bridgett and Linthorne, 2006). However, it is also likely
that what are termed “domain-general skills” including psycho-
logical skills and metacognition may have played a role in his nine
Olympic gold medal winning performances.
As noted earlier (see Table 1), Foster and Weigand (2008) high-
lighted that some theoretical inadequacies in sport psychology
could be reconciled by considering other conceptual frameworks,
including meta-cognitive approaches (Flavell, 1979). For exam-
ple, by augmenting our understanding of psychological skills in
sport with the construct of metacognition, we could more clearly
understand the role of self-monitoring and self-regulation in the
application of the aforementioned strategies.
Moran (1996) suggested that PST in sport is essentially an exer-
cise in meta-cognitive instruction. Thus, in order to help athletes
become independent thinkers, we need to know what they know
and believe about how their ownmindswork. In this regard,meta-
cognitive control processes are especially valuable because they
allow people to change their behavior strategically in accordance
with task demands. Eccles and Feltovich (2008) proposed that
accelerated learning and enhanced performance, and ultimately
expertise, may be the result of a combination of psychological
support skills (e.g., self-talk, goal-setting, relaxation, and mental
practice) and metacognitive abilities. They are domain-general in
that they “can be applied to a variety of novel tasks and domains”
(Eccles and Feltovich, 2008, p. 43). Meta-cognitive skills in this
case are higher order skills that regulate learning and performance,
including the coordination of the use of psychological support
skills (i.e., PST).
Within sport psychology, psychological skills have been shown
to differentiate successful Olympians from their less successful
counterparts (Orlick and Partington, 1988; Gould et al., 2002;
Fletcher and Sarkar, 2012). The coordinating role of metacogni-
tion may be a key factor in the efficient use of psychological skills.
Furthermore, emotional regulation is trainable and sustainable by
the application of PST and this has applications beyond the realm
of sport (Eccles et al., 2011). Two other aspects of psychological
skills that are indeed trainable are now discussed, meta-imagery
and routines.
Is meta-imagery linked to expertise?
One dimension of metacognition that has been illuminated by
recent research activity is “meta-imagery,” a performer “beliefs
about the nature and regulation of their own imagery skills”
(Moran, 2002, p. 415). In 2002, little was known about this
topic relative to the knowledge base on other aspects of imagery,
such as motor imagery. Over the preceding years research in
the expertise literature emerged to suggest that meta-imagery is
another factor that differentiates novices from experts (Moran
et al., 2012). Researchers had explored the topic by asking athletes
to indicate why, where, how, what, and when they use men-
tal imagery processes (e.g., Munroe et al., 2000; MacIntyre and
Moran, 2007a,b). Athletes’ responses from both interviews and
surveys demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of the multi-
modal potential of imagery, showed they employed imagery in
creative ways for contingency planning (see Moran, 2009) and
were also aware of robust imagery effects (e.g., mental prac-
tice). Interestingly, a meta-analysis conducted in 1994, indicated
a possible constraint on the efficacy of mental practice for novice
learners (i.e., experts improved more). Driskell et al. (1994) sug-
gested that novices may not have an appropriate approximation
of the motor skill or that their imagery abilities may be insuffi-
cient to generate and manipulate the requisite visuo-spatial motor
configuration. An alternative possibility is that experts may sim-
ply possess greater meta-cognitive knowledge of how to employ
imagery effectively for skill improvement as compared to novices
(MacIntyre et al., 2013). In fact, a model of meta-imagery was
developed to account for the above findings and this also gener-
ates possibilities of developing a test of meta-imagery (MacIntyre
and Moran, 2010).
Furthermore, contemporary evidence from cognitive psychol-
ogy supports the role of meta-cognitive knowledge of imagery
ability and relates it to our ability to judge individual episodes of
imagery (Pearson et al., 2011). The voluntary nature of imagery
and the role of conscious awareness during imagery tasks make
it amenable to introspection, ironically the method that was cen-
tral to the demise of the scientific study of imagery, a century ago
(Roeckelein, 2004).
Is winning just a matter of routine?
Pre-performance routines are integral to performance excellence
in many self-paced sporting skills, from sprint running to penalty
taking infield games (Singer,2000,2002; Jackson andBaker,2001).
Defined by Moran (1996, p. 177) as “a sequence of task-relevant
thoughts and actions which an athlete engages in systematically
prior to his or her performance of a specific sports skill.” The
widespread use of routines in sport demonstrates that attention is
central to cognitive sport psychology because the ability to exert
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1155 | 6
MacIntyre et al. Metacognition and sporting expertise
mental effort effectively is vital for optimal athletic performance
(Moran, 2009). One function of routines is to regulate arousal
prior to skill execution and evidence for their role in buffering
stress or choking has also emerged (Mesagno and Mullane-Grant,
2010). While routines have been explored across a range of sports,
perhaps, the sport of golf has received the most attention from
researchers (e.g., McCann et al., 2001; Cotterill et al., 2010). Inter-
estingly, three time major winner golfer Padraig Harrington is
quoted as saying “my key isn’t working at the moment so we
have to figure out a way. . . I have gone a bit stale focusing
on the target.” What is instructive about this statement is that
the golfer appears to realize that his routine is no longer func-
tioning appropriately. Routines need to be revised regularly to
avoid the routine itself becoming too automatic (Moran, 1996).
From a metacognitive perspective, this may be accounted for by
metacognitive monitoring. Thus metacognition may be funda-
mental to the refinement of pre-performance routines as well
as their acquisition. A recent review noted that “at a funda-
mental level it is still not clear what function routines fulfill,
what they should consist of or the most effective way to teach
them” (Cotterill, 2010, p. 132). The potential for metacogniton
research to shed light on the development and refinement of
routines as well as their theoretical and conceptual basis is readily
apparent.
NEW AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In the preceding paragraphs, arguments for the potential for the
construct of metacognition to clarify our understanding of exper-
tise have been made. Now we wish to specify research topics
augmented by appropriate methodologies and possible tasks (see
Table 2).
Measurement
One of the key challenges in the operationalization of any con-
struct is the development of appropriate measurement tools. At
present, there is a paucity of questionnaires to assess metacog-
nitive abilities. One such measure is the 52-item Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory (Schraw and Dennison, 1994) which employs
a two factor model (knowledge of cognition; regulation of cog-
nition). Currently, there is a need to develop and validate revised
psychometric instruments to assess, for example, meta-imagery
beliefs and knowledge. Further questionnaires for meta-attention
Table 2 | Proposed research topics, methods, and objectives of future studies to study expertise and metacognition in sport settings.
Research topic Methods Objectives
Measurement Psychometric and
experimental approach
To engage in conceptual analysis of the construct of metacognition (and related constructs).
To investigate, using dual-task methods, the distinct cognitive processes underlying metacognition (e.g.,
interference with aspects of working memory).
To create psychometrically valid measures of metacognition and action processes (e.g., meta-imagery).
Motor cognition Action simulation and
converging methods
To generate specific hypotheses to empirically test if metacognition is a domain-general skill across
different motor simulation processes.
To use paradigms from motor cognition (e.g., mental travel studies) to evaluate metacognitive monitoring
ability.
Anxiety Experimental and field
study approach
To investigate stereotype threat and the interaction with metacognitive processes in both well-learned
and novel skills.
To examine how current affect and anticipated affective responses to performance influence action in
sports via meta-cognitive thoughts.
To examine how metacognitive training can influence skilled performance and athletes’ susceptibility to
overcompensation of attention.
Neuroscience Neural imaging To investigate the neural substrates of the existing models of cognitive control that relate to
metacognition processes.
To specify the neural architecture underlying metacognitive abilities.
To elucidate whether metacognition is linked to a global mechanism or if distributed neural substrates
underlie different components of metacognition.
Developmental Mixed-methods To assess the role of cognitive development in the acquisition of meta-cognitive skills.
To explore the potential of interventions to enhance metacognitive abilities among those who experience
deficits in, for example, their judgments of learning.
To understand the interaction between metacognitive abilities and motor skill acquisition across the
lifespan (e.g., how the elderly can cope using metacognitive skills to supplement diminishing working
memory).
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or social metacognition (for team sports) could also be piloted,
refined and analyzed using factor analysis. Parallel with the objec-
tive would be the refinement of the construct of metacognition
as it relates to both expertises. Tarricone (2011) had conducted
a comprehensive “taxonomy of metacognition” which is primar-
ily focused upon on the wide-scale research in the educational
research domain. A similar task would be beneficial for metacog-
nition within the context of expertise and the models discussed
in this review (e.g., Bless et al., 2009). The approach of Fleming
and Lau (2014, p. 1) who distinguish between “metacognitive bias
(a difference in subjective confidence despite basic task perfor-
mance remaining constant), metacognitive sensitivity (how good
one is at distinguishing between one’s own correct and incor-
rect judgments) and metacognitive efficiency (a subject’s level
of metacognitive sensitivity given a certain level of task perfor-
mance)”raises interestingquestions for the studyof metacognition
and conscious awareness. Their approach, focusing on percep-
tual expertise, includes elements which have a direct relevance
to expert performance. For instance, they suggest that “metacog-
nitive confidence” can be interpreted as a probability judgment
directed toward one’s own decisions-the probability of a previous
judgment being correct. This is synonymous with expertise (i.e.,
ability to predict actions). It is our view that the exploration of the
construct of metacognition and how they interface with action
related processes (e.g., motor imagery), we can contribute to the
conceptual development of the construct of metacognition. The
divergent approaches to date necessitate a degree of conceptual
analysis, a process that is all too rare in psychology (Machado and
Silva, 2007).
Motor cognition
Recent conceptualizations of imagery, action observation and
motor execution, view these processes as overlapping, differing
by degree rather than kind (Jeannerod, 1994, 2006; Vogt et al.,
2013). The preceding section on meta-imagery is illustrative of
the progress that can be made in our understanding of exper-
tise, metacognition and imagery, alike. Given the overlap between
for example, imagery (e.g., visualizing a long jump-the run-up,
take-off, and landing phases) and action observation (e.g., view-
ing Bob Beamons’world record long jump), a question arises as to
whether the same metacognitive processes underlie these related
processes. This issue is further complicated by evidence from sev-
eral sources which suggests motor imagery is grounded in physical
experience, for example, the specific training either simulated or
executed (Olson and Nyberg, 2011; Debarnot et al., 2014). The
question remains as to whether the respective metacognitive pro-
cesses are domain-general or domain-specific? As a result, deeper
conceptual analysis is required to comprehensively describe and
explain the range of metacognitive processes that pertain to cog-
nitive simulation strategies. This new dimension to metacognition
research offers a range of experimental possibilities that can enable
a greater understanding of metacognition with regard to action
preparation, simulation, and execution.
Anxiety
Research on “choking” in sport has illuminated our understand-
ing of anxiety across both cognitive skills (e.g., Lyons and Beilock,
2012) and motor skill contexts (e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001;
Beilock and Gonso, 2008; DeCaro et al., 2011; Toner and Moran,
2011; Toner et al., 2013). The “explicit monitoring hypothesis”
suggests that attending to a well learned skill may lead to failure
in the precise execution of the skill under pressure. Metacogni-
tive abilities obviously have a role in regulation emotion, based on
the aforementioned model by Bless et al. (2009). Furthermore,
the role of “stereotype threat” which occurs when “knowledge
of a negative stereotype about a social group leads to a les-
than-optimal performance by members of that group” should
be investigated from a metacognitive perspective (Beilock and
McConnell, 2004). Previous investigations supported the con-
tention that stereotype threat prompts attention to the executed
action and thus can disrupt performance (Beilock et al., 2003).
However, this effect can be alleviated by the inclusion of a sec-
ondary task. Findings across two studies conducted by Beilock
et al. (2003) were inconsistent and the impact of stereotype threat
may be more telling across a tournament than a putting skill
as it may interfere with the metacognitive processes that help
modulate attention and regulate emotion. Another avenue is to
systematically examine howcurrent affect and anticipated affective
responses to performance influence action in sports via meta-
cognitive thoughts. This is based on the recent literature on
affect regulation (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein, 2011)
Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate how training
in metacognition can influence skilled performance and ath-
letes’ susceptibility to overcompensation of attention and affect
regulation.
Neuroscience
The rise of neuroscience in recent decades has been based largely
upon advances in methodologies that facilitate the study of inter-
nal mental experiences, such as metacognition, in a robust and
scientific way. Cognitive neuroscience, in particular, has had a
dramatic effect on our understanding of individual domains of
cognition from vision to memory (Beran et al., 2012), in chess
(Bilalic et al., 2010, 2012; Bartlett et al., 2013) and more recently
in sport (Debarnot et al., 2014). As we have seen throughout the
current paper sport and athletic skills offer a dynamic and fascinat-
ing arena to study and explore cognitive processes, metacognitive
processes, and experiences.
Regarding expertise, we saw that in order to engage in effec-
tive training episodes for long periods of time, athletes must be
highly self-disciplined and self-regulated (Crews et al., 2001). This
notion of self-regulation, defined as a set of cognitive, behavioral,
and motivational processes that interact to influence performance
(Kitsantas and Kavussanu, 2011) has been the go-to approach
for examining expertise differences in performance domains.
This approach has been concerned with self-regulatory processes
(imagery, attentional control, for example) and researchers typi-
cally attempted to make confidence judgments about the efficacy
of some aspect of their cognition. Neuroscience has enabled
researchers to move beyond the study of processes and focus on
metacognitive judgments instead (a case in point being; the feel-
ing of inaccessibility otherwise known as the tip of the tongue
phenomena). This temporary failure of retrieval for a memory
highlights a problem with a particular cognitive process but not
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a problem with one’s metacognitive judgment. What tip of the
tongue research has shown us is that different underlying pro-
cesses are responsible for the cognition and metacognition that
monitors it (Schwartz and Diaz, 2014). Metacognitive experiences
arise from cognitive processes and correspond to particular behav-
iors. The cognitive processes that produced the behavior are not
the same as the processes that gave rise to the metacognition.
For example, an object is recognized as having been seen before
(cognitive process) accompanied by an experience of confidence,
and the person then says that they know the answer (behavior).
Essentially, there are a set of cognitive processes driving the recall
of information but another set of processes driving our aware-
ness of it. “Thus understanding any metacognitive judgment must
involve understanding the cognition it measures and the multiple
processes that contribute to the judgment” (Schwartz and Diaz,
2014, p. 9). Attempts at componential analysis of metacognition
are in their infancy (Fleming and Lau, 2014; Garrison, 2014), but
they appear to be fruitful with regard to understanding its impact
upon visual perceptual tasks. Nevertheless, the investigation of the
neural basis of metacognition (Baird et al., 2013) is not without
its limitations. It has been noted that the application of neu-
rophysiological measurement techniques impose restrictions on
the ecological validity of studies which are not readily overcome
(Mann et al., 2013).
Developmental
Currently, a gap exists in our knowledge of how performers
acquire pre-performance routines (Singer, 2000, 2002; Cotter-
ill, 2010). Unfortunately, researchers have neglected to explore
how these strategies are developed over time with one recent
notable exception, a studywith gymnastics athletes (Faggiani et al.,
2012). The role of cognitive development in the acquisition of
meta-cognitive skills may be a limiting factor for applied sport
psychology interventions (Foster and Weigand, 2008). Thus the
gap in the knowledge base may be due to the complex inter-
action of domain-general and domain-specific cognitive skills.
Given that our approach has centered on the role of metacog-
nitive abilities and processes, we propose that a developmental
approach to understanding pre-performance routines could be
augmented by exploring metacognitive skill development from a
longitudinal perspective. The potential of specific interventions
to enhance metacognitive ability could be explored for those who
are impaired in their metacognitive development or for those who
suffer plateaus in their skill development. For example, recent
research has demonstrated the ability of a 2-week meditation pro-
gram in enhancingmetacognitive ability in aperceptual task (Baird
et al., 2014).
CONCLUSION
Do metacognitive processes enhance performance? Are they help-
ful in the acquisition of expertise? The general answer to these
questions is in the affirmative. Metacognitive processes are part of
the inventory of human thought (Nelson and Narens, 1994; Stern-
berg, 2001; Perfect and Schwartz, 2002). As such, they serve as a
resource to structure thought and regulate behavior.Willmetacog-
nitive processes always lead to better outcomes? No, certainly
not. As for all areas of information processing, people can err.
However, understanding the role of metacognition, the breadth
and flexibility of processes involved and how they are associated
with expertise, allows for more precise predictions of behavior.
We argue that more research and empirical scrutiny of the con-
struct of metacognition can help to develop principles that govern
the relation between internal cognitive processes and subjective
experience. These principles could be very effective for expertise
research looking to differentiate a “real” expert from a “skilled”
performer, currently a major challenge in expertise research (e.g.,
MacIntyre et al., 2013; Bourne et al., 2014).
In the sporting domain, training athletes to initiate, develop
and engage in metacognition can equip them with the proper
strategies, beliefs, and self-understanding to excel in sports.
Currently, there is no unified view as to what athletic train-
ing entails and coaches, despite a burgeoning literature (Healy
et al., 2014) have, for example, focused on a relatively nar-
row set of conclusions from the deliberate practice literature
(Baker and Young, 2014). Metacognition offers the potential to
expand our understanding of expertise and individual domains
of cognition through a rigorous examination of the mecha-
nisms underlying self-initiated monitoring and control of ones
own performance. Consequently, our understanding of expertise
can be illuminated by studying metacognition in the sporting,
domain, specifically, by using a strength-based approach with
expert samples (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Sport offers researchers
a fertile natural laboratory where expertise is easily quantifiable
through the quest to be faster, higher and stronger. In conclu-
sion, we have demonstrated that the construct of metacognition
has the potential to be a springboard for research into sporting
expertise.
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